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my students reading courses Colombian Constitutional and Political Institutions

To read Tuesday's Constitutional Government in the Faculty of Social Communication: 7-9 am

Constitution. Article 86 Title II

Osuna, Nestor, Notes on the concept of Fundamental Rights, 37 subjects of public law, 1997.

Constitution. Title II. Art 28-30, 15, 20, Article 23

To read the course of Political Institutions at the Faculty of Finance and International Relations: 11-1pm

Ramirez, Gonzalo (Editor), The Law in the context of globalization, Bogotá, Universidad Externado, 2007, pages: 189-218

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New Book My colleague Germain Lozano: Political Control in Colombian constitutional law: a diluted concept in legal control or an idea that should be consolidated? Point de vue

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Oliver Roy dans Le Monde: post-Islamic Revolution

Interesting article

French expert Olivier Roy of the Islamic world in the journal "Le Monde"

REUTERS / ALI JAREKJI

The European opinion interprets the popular uprisings in North Africa and Egypt through a gate dating back more than thirty years: the Islamic revolution of Iran. She expects to see Islamist movements, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and their local counterparts, to be either the lead or in ambush, ready to take power. But discretion and pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood astonish and disturb where are the Islamists?

But if you look at those who launched the movement, it is clear that this is a generation post-Islamist. The great revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s, for them it's ancient history, those of their parents. This new generation is not interested in ideology: the slogans are pragmatic and practical ("releases", " erhal "), it does not appeal to Islam as their predecessors did in Algeria in the late 1980s. They express above all a rejection of corrupt dictatorships and a demand for democracy. This obviously does not mean that protesters are secular, but they just do not see in Islam a political ideology can create a better order: they are in a secular political space. And same goes for other ideologies: they are nationalists (see waved) but does not advocate nationalism. More original is the muting of conspiracy theories: the United States and Israel (and France in Tunisia, which has yet backed Ben Ali to end) are not designated as the cause of unhappiness in the Arab world. Even pan-Arabism has disappeared as a slogan, even though the effect of mimicry that lays the Egyptians and Yemenis in Street following the events in Tunis shows that there is a political reality in the Arab world.

This generation is pluralistic, probably because it is too individualistic. Sociological studies show that this generation is more educated than the previous, longer lives in nuclear families, have fewer children, but at the same time, she is unemployed or lives in the social downgrading. She is more informed, and often has access to modern communications which allow to connect a network from person to person without passing through mediation political parties (banned anyway). Young people know that Islamist regimes have become dictatorships: they are not fascinated by Iran nor Saudi Arabia. Those who display in Egypt are precisely those who were demonstrating against Ahmadinejad in Iran (for reasons of propaganda the Tehran regime pretends to support the movement in Egypt, but it is a reckoning with Mubarak). They may be believers, but that separate their political demands: in this sense the movement is "secular" because it separates religion and politics. Religious practice was individualized.

is manifested above all in dignity, to "respect": this slogan is from Algeria in the late 1990s. The values \u200b\u200bwhich we claim are universal. But democracy is being asked today is not an imported product: it's all the difference with the promotion of democracy made by the Bush administration in 2003, which was not admissible because it had no political legitimacy and was associated with a military intervention. Paradoxically weakening of the United States in the Middle East, and the pragmatism of the Obama administration, is now offering a native application democratic legitimacy to speak.

However a revolt is not a revolution. The movement has no leaders, no political party and no supervision, which is consistent with its nature but the problem of institutionalization of democracy. It is unlikely that the disappearance of a dictatorship automatically establishing a liberal democracy, as Washington had hoped for Iraq. There are in every Arab country, as elsewhere, a political landscape even more complicated than it has been overshadowed by the dictatorship. But in fact, apart from the Islamists and, very often unions (even weak), there is not much.

ISLAMISTS GONE BUT DID NOT HAVE CHANGED

We call Islamists who see in Islam a political ideology to solve all the problems of society. The most radical left the scene to the international jihad and are no longer there: they are in the desert with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Pakistan or in the suburbs of London. They have no social or political basis. The global jihad movement is completely disconnected social and national struggles. Of course the propaganda of Al-Qaeda tries to present the movement as the vanguard of the entire Muslim community against Western oppression, but that does not work. Al-Qaida is recruiting young jihadists de-territorialization without social base, which have all cut their neighborhood and their families. Al-Qaida remains locked in his logic of "propaganda by deed" and never bothered to build a political structure within Muslim societies. Like most action of Al-Qaida takes place mainly in the West or is defined as Western targets, its impact in real societies is zero.

Another optical illusion is to link the massive re-Islamization What seemed to know what companies in the Arab world over the last thirty years with a political radicalization. If Arab societies are more visibly Islamic it was thirty or forty years, why the absence of Islamic slogans in current events? This is the paradox of Islam: it was largely depoliticized Islam. The re-Islamization social and cultural (the veil, the number of mosques, the multiplication of preachers, religious television) took place outside Islamic militants, it has also opened a "religious market" that nobody has a monopoly and is also in line with the new quest of the religious youth, which is individualistic but also changing. In short the Islamists have lost the monopoly on religious speech in public space, they had in the 1980s.

First dictatorships have often (but not in Tunisia) favored a conservative Islam, but little visible political obsessed with control of customs. The headscarf has become commonplace. This conservatism of the state found itself in step with the movement called "Salafi" which emphasizes on the re-Islamization of individuals and not on social movements. In short, as paradoxical as it may seem, the Islamic revival has led to a trivialization and politicization of religious marker: when everything is religious, nothing is religious. Which, in view of the West, was seen as a big green wave of Islamic revival that finally does a trivialization: everything becomes Islamic fast-food to women's fashion. But the forms of piety were also individualized: it builds faith, we seek the preacher who speaks of self-realization, as the Egyptian Amr Khaled, and we do more interested in the utopian Islamic state. The "Salafis" are focused on the defense of religious symbols and values \u200b\u200bbut have no political agenda: they are absent from the protest where you do not see women in burqas (when there are many women among the protesters, even in Egypt). And other religious currents that belief back, such as Sufism, bloom again. This diversification also released the religious framework of Islam, as seen in Algeria or Iran, with a wave of conversions to Christianity.

Another mistake is to design as defending the dictatorships secularism against religious fanaticism. Authoritarian regimes do not secularized societies, on the contrary, except in Tunisia, they are accommodated in a re-Islamization of fundamentalist neo, which speaks to implement sharia without asking the question of the nature state. Everywhere the ulama and religious institutions have been domesticated by official state while falling back on a chilly theological conservatism. So the traditional clerics, trained at Al-Azhar, are no longer in the loop or on the political issue, nor even on the big issues of society. They have nothing to offer the new generations seeking new models to live their faith in a more open world. But as a religious conservatives are no longer on the side of popular protest.

KEY CHANGE

Mohammed Badie, the supreme leader since January 2010 the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, during a press conference May 30, 2010. AFP / -

This change also affects the political Islamist movements, which are embodied in the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood and their followers, as the party Nahda in Tunisia. The Muslim Brotherhood has changed. The first point is of course the experience of failure, both in the apparent success (the Islamic Revolution of Iran), in defeat (repression waged against them everywhere). The new generation of militants has learned, as well as former Rachid Ghannouchi in Tunisia. They understand that taking the power after a revolution is led to civil war or the dictatorship in their struggle against the repression they are closer to other political forces. Good connoisseurs of their own society, they know as little weight to ideology. They also learned from the Turkish model: Erdogan and the AKP have been able to reconcile democracy, electoral victory, economic development, national independence and promote Islamic values, if not, at least "authenticity".

Above the Muslim Brotherhood are not holders of another economic or social model. They have become conservative about morals, and liberals on the economy. And this is probably the most notable developments: in the years 1980, the Islamists (but especially the Shiites) claiming to defend the interests of the oppressed classes and advocated a nationalization of the economy, and redistribution of wealth. Today the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood endorsed the cons-agrarian reform conducted by Mubarak, which is to give landowners the right to increase the leases and return their farmers. So that the Islamists are no longer present in the social movements that agitate the Nile Delta, where there is now a return of the "left" is that of union activists.

But gentrification Islamists are also a plus for democracy: lack of play on the map of the Islamic revolution, he pushes them to conciliation, compromise and alliance with other political forces. The question today is not whether dictatorships are the best bulwark against Islamism or not. The Islamists have become agents of the democratic game. They will of course weigh in the direction of greater control of morals, but without relying on a system of repression as in Iran, or a religious police in Saudi Arabia as they will have to cope with demand freedom does not stop the right to elect a parliament. Brief or the Islamists will identify with the traditional and conservative Salafi stream, losing their claim to believe in Islam, modernity, or they will have to make an effort to rethink their conception of the relationship between religion and politics.

The Muslim Brotherhood will be even more a key to change the generation in revolt little effort to organize itself politically. We remain in the revolt of protest, not in the announcement of a new type of regime. In addition, Arab societies are rather conservative, middle class that developed in Following the economic liberalization want political stability: they are protesting primarily against the predatory nature of dictatorships, which borders on kleptomania in the Tunisian regime. The comparison between Tunisia and Egypt is instructive. Tunisia Ben Ali clan had weakened all his potential allies by refusing to share not only power but also wealth: the class of business was literally cheated by standing in the family, and the army was left not only offside on the political level, but especially outside of the distribution of wealth: the Tunisian army was poor, it even has a corporatist interest to have a democratic system which will probably a larger budget.

For cons the regime in Egypt had a broader social base, the military is associated not only power but also to manage the economy and profits. Demand Democratic Butera then throughout the Arab world on the social roots of patronage networks of each plan. There is an interesting anthropological dimension: the demand for democracy is it able to overcome the complex network of allegiances and memberships of intermediate social bodies (whether military, tribes, political patronage, etc.).. What is the capacity of systems to play on traditional allegiances (the Bedouin in Jordan, the tribes in Yemen)? How these groups can or not to tap into this demand for democracy and become actors? How the religious reference is to diversify and adapt to new situations? The process will be long and chaotic, but one thing is certain: we are no longer in the Arab-Muslim exceptionalism. Current events reflect a radical change in Arab societies. These changes are long gone, but they were overshadowed by the deep-rooted stereotypes that the West hung on the Middle East.

Twenty years ago, I published The Failure of Political Islam . It has been read or not does not matter, but what is happening today shows that local actors have taken their own lessons from their own history. We have not finished with Islam, yes, and liberal democracy is not the "end of history", but we now think of Islam as part of its empowerment relative to a culture known as "Arab-Muslim" who no more today than yesterday was closed on itself.

O livier Roy, professor and director of the Mediterranean European University Institute in Florence (Italy)

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Externado University 125 years

Tomo esta nota

mid colegas Gonzalo Ramirez:

" Nicolás Pinzón Warlosten funda el 15 de febrero de 1886 en una Galleries of what is now the Palace Lievano , Mayor of Bogotá , a liberal-leaning university for external students, hence the name of Daytime. Regeneration closed at the Law of Horses, the university was reopened by Diego Mendoza Perez . Then comes the stewardship of Richard Hinestrosa Daza, one of the last liberal radicals. In 1955 up to the Rectory Dr. Fernando Forero Hinestrosa , elected by the Board of Directors University Rector before the death of Hinestrosa Daza . The university operated until the early seventies in the headquarters of the Barrio Santa Fe then Transfer to the headquarters of the eastern hills in this race first twelve. Tomorrow will mark 125 years of the Foundation of the External University of Colombia . He left with the invitation, for interested and already attend Congratulations to Alma Mater. Page Externado "

Long live outside and the Rector, Fernando Hinestrosa
here.

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meet again Kenji Orito Diaz: The discipline of intelligence for Colombian Constitutional Reading

Kenji

Again Orito Diaz poses a lecture on discipline and intelligence

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To my students in the class of "Constitutional Law Colombiano" I leave a link with the article written by Professor Juan Carlos Upegui, in the Journal of the State of the External University of Colombia "Freedom of expression, social networks and criminal law. Nicolás Castro Case Study."

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test the inclusion of a map

Using the Google Maps tool you can create a route on a map, save my map and have links and code to insert into a Web page. We'll see if it works, which will help in the future to megalithic walking maps. In this case I put a map with the route of my trip to Romania and its famous monasteries of Moldavia.

View Travel to Romania on a larger map

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Catherine Ashton dans Le Monde: Aider the "démocratie profonde à

Les soulèvements dans certains countries bordering the Mediterranean and the Middle East are real challenges for Europe and the rest of the Western world, especially in regard to our policy of democratization. Two principles should underpin the work of the European Union in this field. We Europeans know how the road to freedom can be long and difficult. Throughout the twentieth century ^e , our progress towards liberal democracy has been chaotic and slow.

The EU itself has emerged from the ashes of several conflicts that have ravaged our continent and showed the consequences dramatic failure of democracy. If we add the mixed results of the European empires, it is clear that the EU needs to show humility vis-à-vis its partners. Of course this should not be a reason not to say that democracy is the necessary foundation of human progress.

Democracy does not consist only of the possibility of voting and elections. European history has taught us that we must build a democracy that is not front and a democracy that I describe as "deep" and requires several conditions: respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression, an independent judiciary and an impartial administration.

It also requires respect for property rights, including the courts, and by the existence of free trade unions. It can not be reduced to changes of governments, but requires both behavioral and institutional frameworks. In the long term, thin democracy - one that boils down to the free vote of the people to choose a government - can not survive if democracy "deep" is not rooted.

We have already begun to implement these principles in our work with the new government of Tunisia. This week, during his first trip abroad, Ounaïes Ahmed, the new Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Brussels to my invitation. I promised that the EU would support, much as it may, his country on the path chosen by the Tunisian people: one to a real democracy, reform and social justice. This support is not limited to organizing free and fair elections but it will also include the fight against corruption, improving transparency of local government and strengthening the independence of justice.

The EU has already increased its budget available to support civil society in Tunisia. We will soon send experts to Tunisia to assess the situation, and on this basis, we will adjust our assistance program to help people more directly. I'm sure it will be the first in a long series of missions.

In the short term, priority will be to advise the transitional authorities in electoral matters. Supporting civil society, we hope to have guarantees that free elections can be held and played consistently in the years to come, and not just on one occasion.

Similarly, the European Union will offer its full support to Egypt which will engage without delay in a real democratic transition. Egyptian leaders must meet the aspirations of their people. The time has come for a peaceful transformation. I asked the authorities to immediately begin the transition to genuine democratic reforms that will organizing free and fair elections.

In Egypt and Tunisia, the challenge is to build the foundations of a "deep democracy" here too, the EU stands ready to contribute.

We are witnessing profound changes in the Middle East. The contours are not yet clear, and indeed they may not even be. But we can build on some benchmarks. We know that the role of Turkey will be even more important, both as a partner in the European Union but also as a center for moderation democratic. We also know that rapid progress in the peace process in the Middle East are vital, now more than ever.

The EU does not wish to promote models or ready to give lessons on what should be the new political systems of our partners. It is the responsibility of the peoples of the region, not ours. But we must commit ourselves seriously to help in the short and long term. The European Union is perhaps not the best partner to undertake rapid, but it is often the one who stays the longest. We do not want to support regime change, but the system changes.

The "deep democracy" is the best, and certainly the only answer to those who fear that the repayment of tyranny leads to a populist anti-Western extremism is. The European experience teaches us that democracy is the necessary foundation for tolerance, peace and prosperity. North Africa and the Arab world, this goal is not reached quickly or without obstacles. But building a "deep democracy" is the necessary condition.

---

Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union She is also Vice-President of the European Commission

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s'enraciner Edgar Morin et dans Bibliotèque Medicis Marcel Gauchet

again Bookcase Medicis is a cyclical pause in its emissions to interfere in a fascinating discussion on the future, the crisis and globalization. For the debate, Jean-Pierre Elkabach invited Edgar Morin, sociologist, philosopher, Henri and Marcel Gauchet Guaino, special adviser Nicolas Sarcozy

I leave you with this discussion:
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Patrick Klugman dans Le Monde: La garde à vue, justice exception française et d'exception

S i want us all remains as it is that everything must change ". Certainly, the Chancery was replayed many The Leopard by Giuseppe Tomasi before writing the Bill custody which was discussed recently in Parliament.

If reform showed good intentions, she promised to make no no. Ms Alliot-Marie that it was the will as keeper had however claimed that many would finally advanced to the French criminal procedure into line with European law. Las. Actually advanced, it's effects and announcements of compliance, it is less than ever that question.

ads first. According keeper, the law would first bring down significantly the number of police custody decided each year because the measure would not be applied as the sole punishment of offenses hit at least one year's imprisonment.

But everyone knows there is an excessively reduced crime punishable by a sentence below. Thus, driving with a blood alcohol in the blood exceeds the legal threshold that incur up to two years in prison; the invasion of privacy of privacy or the fact of making an audio or video unlawful to take only these examples, are each punishable by one year in prison ... The police can be assured it will be much more difficult to find an offense does not result in placement in custody than the reverse.

Among the advances, the Chancery had also put forward a ban full body searches and notification to the custody of his right to remain silent.

Strip searches are already regulated by Article 63-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that "when it is necessary for the purposes of the investigation to make Investigations internal body of a person in custody, they can be performed by a physician required for that purpose ". Ignorance of this text and the widespread use of this degrading practice had already involved a ministerial circular of 11 May 2003 and most recently, a memorandum from the Director General of National Police, dated June 9, 2008 . Without any effect. The new text proposes a framework which already is. There is concern whatsoever with the same success.

As for the notification to police custody his right to remain silent, there was so much about it swings in a decade that it is having seasick Between 2000 and 2002, Article 63-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that in custody are advised of their right to remain silent. This provision had been reduced once in March 2002 before being repealed a year later. It should now reappear. Good. But these delays will not change, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and fortunately has long held that the right to silence was consubstantial with the presumption of innocence and should be applied at all stages of the procedure .

For all these advances that are not no one could at least hope it would be done any place the lawyer under police custody. The decisions of the ECHR and the Constitutional Council and Supreme Court are clear about this: the questioning of a person from the police investigation without the assistance of a lawyer violates the right to trial fair and the same rights of defense.

Indeed, in the proposed reform, every effort has been made to provide assistance of counsel ... and without it!

If the reform was adopted, regardless of the reason for placement in custody, the prosecutor or the judge of freedoms, may postpone the presence of counsel for a twelve hour or twenty four hours for the rule of law common and for a period of forty-eight or seventy-two hours to the custody derogatory (terrorism, drugs etc..) Thus, despite the strong condemnation of the Court of Cassation, it was not intended to waive shifted to the exercise of rights of defense for the most serious offenses that lead to this paradoxical result: the regime is more severe, less held in custody is in ability to defend itself.

Worse, to justify the presence of counsel delayed in custody, it has been suggested in the bill "the need to collect or preserve evidence gathering" or prevent "harm to people" . Would it imply that the lawyer who is an officer of justice, steals documents relevant to ascertaining the truth or worse it may sponsor or be an accomplice in a homicide?

The continuation of these provisions as blurred as scandalous relic of a time when the lawyer was also suspicious that his client could in any case submitted to the procedure to be reformed retoquée, barely passed. What about even the fact, that in matters of terrorism, the lawyer would necessarily chosen by the barrister on a list established by the Bar Council, which is an attack characterized the defense of free choice is nevertheless a another principle enshrined in European law?

But this is not the worst. power after grossly abused the practice of custody thought just a sprinkling of old rights presented as a new and supposedly increased presence of counsel to conform to French criminal procedure under European law. It is not.

The surprise did not come on the side of the lawyer to whom the door was opened but the prosecutor, theoretically loaded as magistrate guarantor of individual freedoms, to control the guard view.

The condemnation of France to the ECHR 23 November 2010 (Case France Moulin v. France) rings in this as a rude awakening: the prosecutor, judicial supervision of police custody is not a magistrate within the meaning of the European Court because it is not independent screws vis the executive. The position of the Strasbourg court if it is not new (Case Medevedyev v. France) is no less bold. Beyond the effective control of police custody is being questioned is the question of linking the wooden seat and therefore the organization of the French judicial system that is asked. The new Minister of Justice has shown that point sans équivoques&nbsp;: peu importe les décisions des plus hautes juridictions françaises et européennes, le procureur, juge soumis, gardera la direction des gardes à vue&nbsp;!

Il reste en définitive, au vu projet présenté au Parlement quelques améliorations qui n'atténuent pas le sentiment d'une occasion manquée. Quel gâchis en effet d'avoir préféré à tout prix une réforme bâclée à une justice souveraine et respectueuse des droits de chacun. Des centaines de milliers de gardes à vue réalisées chaque année dans des conditions indignes méritaient mieux and in any case that we put an end to an exceptional justice who is also a French exception.

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Political Institutions Course Faculty finance and international relations course program

SCHOOL OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

COURSE PROGRAM

3 Semester

SESSION 1: Presentation of the program and the rules applied to the subject.

SESSION 2: The State and the various forms of state. Concept of the state and its evolution. The elements of State. Distinición with the notion of nation.

READING MATERIAL: TURBAY VELASQUEZ, Camilo. constitutional law, Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 1998. BARBOSA DELGADO, F, Justice: Ruptures and continuities, Bogotá, Universidad Javeriana, 2007.

SESSION 3: The different forms of state. Criteria for determining different forms of state: territorial relations between rulers and ruled. Current problems of the state.

READING MATERIAL: TURBAY VELASQUEZ, Camilo. constitutional law, Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 1998.

ROUSSEAU, JJ, The Social Contract, Barcelona, \u200b\u200bEdit ALTAYA, 1998.

SESSION 4 Globalization and State Sovereignty

READING MATERIAL: RAMIREZ, GONZALO (Editor), The Right in context of globalization, Bogotá, External University, 2007.

SESSION 5: Democracy: essential basis of the rule of law

READING MATERIAL: Robert Dahl. Democracy: a citizen's guide.

CAPUTO, Dante (Editor), Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens Democracy, UNDP, 2004

SESSION 6 : Fundamental rights: Nationally

READING MATERIAL: ARANGO, RODOLFO, Rights, constitutionalism and democracy, Bogotá, External University, 2004.

SESSION 7: Human Rights: Internationally

READING MATERIAL: BARBOSA DELGADO, F, American Litigation, Bogotá, Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 2002.

Villan Duran, CARLOS, Course on International Law of Human Rights, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2006.

SESSION 8: Political Actors: parties

READING MATERIAL. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1994

GUTIERREZ, FRANCISCO "Gone with the Wind? Political parties and democracy in Colombia 1958-2002, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2007.

GUTIERREZ, FRANCISCO, More games? in "At the Crossroads: XXI century Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2006

SESSION 9: The legislative branch

MATERIAL READING

R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. structure of public power in Colombia , Bogotá, Themis, 2006.

SESSION 10: executive branch.

READING MATERIAL: JULIO ESTRADA, Alexei. executive and judicial branches of government in the 1991 Colombian Constitution , Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 2003.

R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. structure of public power Colombia, Bogotá, Themis, 2006.

SESSION 11: judicial branch

READING MATERIAL: JULIO ESTRADA , Alexei. executive and judicial branches of government in the 1991 Colombian Constitution , Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 2003.

R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. structure of public power Colombia, Bogotá, Themis, 2006.

SESSION 12: independent bodies. The Public Ministry. The Comptroller General. The Board of the Bank of the Republic

READING MATERIAL: R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. structure of public power Colombia, Bogotá, Themis , 2001.

SESSION 13: Elections and Electoral Organization: National Electoral Council and National Registry Civil.

READING MATERIAL: R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. structure of public power Colombia, Bogotá, Themis, 2001.

SESSION 14: the land. Principles of land. The departmental and municipal system. The system of districts.

READING MATERIAL: HERNANDEZ BECERRA Augustus. Decentralization autonomy municipal and local power in Colombia. Balance and perspectives of a process 2004. Quito,

national publishing Corporation, 2005.

ROBLEDO, PAULA, municipal autonomy in Colombia, Bogotá, External University, 2009.

SESSION 15: The economic regime. economic principles in the constitution of 1991. Planning. budget. Central Banking

READING MATERIAL : Juan Camilo Restrepo. Treasury. External University of Colombia. 2008.

ARANGO, RODOLFO, Rights, constitutionalism and democracy, Bogotá, Universidad Daytime, 2004.

SESSION 16: resolution of doubts.

Largactil Experiences

Colombian Constitutional Social-Communication

EXTERNADO UNIVERSITY OF COLOMBIA

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATION - JOURNALISM

COURSE NAME

Program COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL

1	Title	Course Name for
2	Level Formed:	Basic
3	Area:	Social and humanistic
4	Semester: intensity hours per week: Credits:	III 2 contact hours 2
5	mode	Chair B (1-2)
6	Prerequisites:	None
7	Period academic	I - 2011
8	Professor	Francisco Barbosa Delgado francisco.barbosa @ uexternado.edu.co

JUSTIFICATION

Colombian constitutional law, is a subject reports a dogmatic and institutional content of the Constitution of 1991.

Find a knowledge of our institutional reality, so that the student of social communication and journalism, is an observer, analyst and critic of the march institutional, political, social and economic life, with the foundation and argument prior knowledge of the state.

The Colombian constitutional course conceived in the cycle of social and humanistic basic training of the Faculty of Social Communication, aims to instill in students the recognition and importance of Colombia is a social state of law, framed on principles and values demo-liberal regimes, recognizing freedom trainer and the need to achieve goals in the social and humanistic.

OBJECTIVES

.

General Purpose

understand and acquire knowledge of the principles, values, rights and organizational structure of the Colombian state.

Specific Objectives

Understand, analyze and grasp the values \u200b\u200band principles within the constitutional framework that recognizes Colombia as a state of law.

Understand, analyze and identify the constitutional guarantees in pursuit of defending human rights and citizen participation mechanisms

understand and analyze the functioning of the branches of government and agencies of state control.

LEARNING SKILLS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Cognitive

Competition	Learning achievements
: ability to know (recognize and distinguish) and knowledge (apply) the elements, objects, categories or codes of the subject Colombian constitutional.	know, understand and analyze the and human rights principles and mechanisms for citizen participation. Understand the institutions of the Republic and its operation.
Contextual: aims to build capacity students study from their perspective, using knowledge of the State Constitutional perspective of social communication and journalism.	Analyze and use knowledge of the Colombian state as a tool and context in the exercise of his profession and journalist.
Communicative: ability to produce appropriate set variety of communication situations, to use different types of speeches and to maintain the flow and consistency communication.	analyze, compare, synthesize, explain, under the expertise of a social state of law, includes speeches, oral and written communicator.
valuation : ability to identify and assume the attitudes, ethical values \u200b\u200band commitments of a professional communication	know, use, analyze under the evaluative content constitutional, a state representative of institutions of demo-liberal regimes goal to be achieved by strengthening from a communicative discourse equally representative of tolerance, respect for the dignity, privacy, solidarity and other constitutional values.

METHODOLOGY

The course is designed to be active. It will combine the lecture and student participation in the implementation of previous readings or video information and / or documentaries. Group work, individual readings, presentations and discussions of various issues will be addressed by students in order that permits the generation of ideas and developing them in a space given to the participation of respect and pluralism.

course's thematic units

Session	Topics develop	sessions Activities face	Activity student self study	Resources
1	Brief constitutional history in the history of Colombia	masterful Chair		Tascon, Tulio Enrique, History of the Colombian constitutional law, External University, 2005
2	features of the rule of law in Colombia. Constitutional principles	masterful Chair	prepare and study the first 10 articles of the Constitution. The student should consider preparing reading specific.	Constitution Upegui, Juan Carlos, Twelve theses on the concept of the rule of law, public law topics 80, 2010.
3	Human Rights: Emphasis on freedom of expression	Chair master. Active student participation. Workshop: Hypothetical	The student should prepare specific reading.	Barbosa, Francisco, indirect censorship against telecommunications companies: a challenge to freedom of thought and expression, "The legal blogs and Web 2.0 for the dissemination and teaching of law, 2010 and "Upegui, Juan Carlos, Freedom of expression, social networks and criminal law: a case study Nicholas Castro, No State Journal, 25, 2010.
4	mechanisms for the protection of Human Rights. L guardianship	masterful Chair reading Control	The student will seek and consider the failure review care. Study respective standards constitutional	Constitution. Article 86 Title II Osuna, Nestor, Notes on the concept of Fundamental Rights, 37 issues of public law, 1997. Constitution. Title II. Art 28-30, 15, 20, Article 23 custody review decision handed down by the Constitutional Court Hon.
5	Habeas Corpus. Habeas Data. The right to rectification. right of petition.	masterful Chair Workshop: Scenario	Study judgments	Constitution. Article 88 Title II Study judgments
6	Popular Shares and Group	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules	Constitution. Title II. Cap. 1 to 4
7	Items Status: population and territory	masterful Chair	Study the respective constitutional rules	VELÁSQUEZ TURBAY, Camilo. Constitutional law , Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 1998.
8	Political Parties Citizen Participation Mechanisms	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules	Constitution. Title IV Cap. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1994
9	political power structure in Colombia: Executive Branch. Colombia and the International System	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules and specific reading	Title VII Constitution Julio Estrada, Alexei. "The executive and judicial branch of government in the Constitution of 1991." External University of Colombia. Bogotá. 2003
10	Executive Branch.	Workshop: decrees state of emergency legislation on social	Current Debate. Press Review	Constitution social emergency decrees. R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. structure of public power Colombia, Bogotá, Themis, 2006.
11	Legislative Branch. Training laws. Judicial Branch.	Chair master.	Study respective constitutional rules and specific reading. Written evaluation	Constitution. Title VI and VIII JULIO ESTRADA, Alexei. "The executive and judicial branch of government in the Constitution of 1991." External University of Colombia. Bogotá. 2003 Evaluation.
12	State Control Agencies. The Discipline Inspection. The Attorney General's Office. to police. The Comptroller General's Office	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules	Constitution. Title X R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. Power structure public Colombia, Bogotá, Themis, 2006.
13	Treasury. State Intervention in the Economy, Planning. Budget.	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules	Constitution Part XII RESTREPO Juan Camilo. Finance public. External University of Colombia. 2008. ARANGO, RODOLFO, Rights, constitutionalism and democracy, Bogotá, Universidad Daytime, 2004.
14	Public Utilities. Bank of the Republic	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules	Constitution. XII
15	Territorial Organization in Colombia. Departments, municipalities, districts, Indian Territory. Regions, provinces, metropolitan areas	masterful Chair	Study respective constitutional rules	Constitution. Title XI BECERRA HERNANDEZ Augusto. Decentralization and local municipal autonomy in Colombia. Balance and perspectives of a process for 2004. Quito, Corporación Editora Nacional, 2005. Robledo, Paul, municipal autonomy in Colombia, Bogotá, Universidad voiced, 2009.
16	The United Nations. UN. The Organization of American States OAS The Andean Community of Nations. CAN The European Union. EU	Workgroups	Prepare presentations and Web search.	Ramirez, Gonzalo, Poverty, Globalization and Law: global, regional and international regulation, 81 subjects of public law, 2009.

CRITERIA

The first 30% will be assessed with the active participation of students, through exhibitions of previous work on group whose priority will be the fundamental principles, human rights and international humanitarian law. The second cut of 30% includes an assessment of progress course content. The third note 40% will be assessed written with an initial development of 20% of the branches of government and the exhibition end of course the other 20%.

will be taken as criteria of evolution in the exhibition: Work teamwork, spontaneity, research, documentation, speech, audiovisual aids. In written evaluations, readiness, relevance, previous study readings.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic Bibliography:

CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA 1991. OSUNA

PATIÑO, Nestor Ivan. Guardianship and Protection: Protected Rights. External University of Colombia. Bogotá

1998 ISBN 958-616-339-3 Ramelli

ARTEAGA, Alejandro. "The Colombian constitution and international humanitarian law." Bogotá. External University of Colombia. 2000 ..

ARANGO, Rodolfo, Rights, constitutionalism and democracy, Bogotá, Universidad Externado, 2004

BARBOSA DELGADO, Francisco, Justice: Ruptures and continuities, Bogotá, Universidad Javeriana, 2007. BARBOSA

DELGADO, Francisco, American Litigation, Bogotá, Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 2002.

CAPUTO, Dante (Editor), Democracy in Latin America: Towards Democracy of citizens, UNDP, 2004.

Robert Dahl. Democracy: a citizen's guide, Madrid, Ed Taurus, 1999

HERNANDEZ BECERRA Augustus. Decentralization municipal autonomy and local power in Colombia. Balance and perspectives of a process 2004. Quito, Corporación Editora Nacional, 2005.

Julio Estrada, Alexei. executive and judicial branches of government in the 1991 Colombian Constitution , Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 2003.

RAMIREZ, Gonzalo (Editor), The Law in the context of globalization, Bogotá, External University, 2007

RAMIREZ, Gonzalo, Poverty, Globalization and Law: global, regional and international regulation, 81 subjects of public law, 2009.

RESTREPO Juan Camilo. Treasury. External University of Colombia. 2008.

ROBLEDO, PAULA, municipal autonomy in Colombia, Bogotá, External University, 2009.

R. RODRIGUEZ, Libardo. Structure of public power in Colombia, Bogotá, Themis, 2006.

ROUSSEAU, JJ, The Social Contract, Barcelona, \u200b\u200bEdit ALTAYA, 1998. VELASQUEZ

Turbay, Camilo. Constitutional law , Bogotá, External University of Colombia, 1998.

Villan Duran, CARLOS, Course on International Law of Human Rights, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2006.

Websites:

www.uexternado.edu.co

http://www.un.org/es/

http://europa.eu/index_es.htm

http://www.oas.org/es/

http://www.comunidadandina.org/

http://www.americaeconomica.com/zonas/can.htm